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NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation, et al. v. Carlucci,
835 F.2d 1282 (Dec. 31, 1987).
FOIA Can Require Reasonsfor
Requesting Records If Requester
Seeks Fee Waiver
Although a person requesting records
under the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cannot be required to
give a reason for the request, if the
requester also applies for the "public
interest" fee waiver, an explanation of
the need for and purpose to which the
records will be put may be required.
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) is a nonprofit organization
which sought records regarding a local
toxic waste site under the control of the
U.S. Department of Defense. Plaintiffs
were also involved in a tort action
against the Air Force regarding the same
site. In addition to requesting records,
MESS also sought a waiver of search
and copying fees, which would total in
excess of $50,000. Before responding to
the request, the FOIA officer requested
answers to 23 questions about MESS'
history, identity, and plans for the information. MESS refused to respond but,
based upon subsequent discussions, the
Department offered to reduce the fees
by 25%.
MESS sued, seeking a full waiver.
The District Court for the Eastern District of California affirmed the 25%
waiver. One week after the district
court's order, Congress amended the
waiver section of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
section 552(a)(4)(A). The new statute,
explicitly made retroactive in impact,
changed the test for waiver from "in the
public interest because furnishing the
information can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public" to
"documents shall be furnished without
any charge or at a charge reduced ...if
disclosure of the information is in the
public interest because it is likely to
contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities
of the government and is not primarily
in the commercial interest of the requester." The amendment also gave the
courts de novo review power, limited to
the record before the agency.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, per
Judges Beezer, Tang, and Lynch, upheld
the 25% waiver. The first test for fee
waivers is that the disclosure of information not be primarily in the commer-

28

*1

LITIGATION
cial interest of the requester. The court
held that MESS passed this test because
its tort claim did not relate to commerce,
trade, or profit. However, on the revised
"public interest" exception-that the
information must be likely to contribute
significantly to public understanding of
the operations of government-the court
held that plaintiffs had not submitted
sufficient information to support the claim.
The court placed heavy emphasis on
the word "significantly". The court held
that MESS' request and intentions were
vague in the record. The court further
opined that "the request gives no indication of requester's ability to understand and process" the requested information, took specific aim at MESS'
name, and suggested without determining that "[r]equester's credibility" was
an issue and there was a "suspicion that
requesters serve as a stalking horse for
private claimants."
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Citizens for Public Accountability, et al.
v. Desert Health Systems, Inc., et al.,
Desert Hospital District,
Real Party in Interest,
.Cal.App.3d_,
88 D.A.R. 2355,
No. E004137 (4th Dist., Feb. 23, 1988).
Court Requires Application of
Open Meeting Law to Private
CorporationOperating Public Hospital
In direct conflict with the First District Court of Appeal, the Fourth District
has held that private corporations which
receive all of the assets, obligations, and
duties of a public hospital district must
comply with the Brown Act, Government
Code section 54950 et seq.
In June 1986, the Desert Hospital
District in Palm Springs completed a
restructuring under which it oversaw the
creation of new, nonprofit private corporations to run the district hospital.
The District transferred all of its assets
to the new corporations, leased the hospital for thirty years, and required that
the new corporations take on all of the
District's duties, obligations, and responsibilities "of every kind, character,
or description." This restructuring was
identical to one which had been orchestrated in northern California for the
Marin General Hospital.
Petitioners, taxpayers and residents
of the District, sought a writ of mandate
and declaratory relief to compel the
private corporations to comply with the
California Open Meetings Law, the

Ralph M. Brown Act, Government Code
section 54950 et seq. Petitioners relied
principally upon a section of the Brown
Act making its requirements applicable
to all multi-member entities which are
"delegated any authority of" a public
agency. The Riverside Superior Court
denied the petition.
This action paralleled a case in Matin
County challenging the Matin restructuring. That case came to final decision in
favor of the hospital while the Desert
Hospital appeal was pending. See
Yoffie, et al. v. Marin HospitalDistrict,
et al., -Cal.App.3d____, 193 Cal.Rptr.
743 (1st Dist., Jul. 15, 1987) (see CRLR
Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1987) p. 112 for background information).
However, when the Fourth District
examined the matter, it declined to follow
the First District's Yoffie opinion, and
held that the Brown Act applied to the
private corporations. The primary difference between the two courts was in their
analysis of Government Code section
54952.2. The First District held that section is superseded by other sections of
the Act which specifically mention private corporations in defining what constitutes a "public agency" under the Act.
However, in neither case had petitioners
sought to make the private entities into
"public agencies". Rather, they sought
coverage under those sections of the Act
which define the "legislative bodies" of
public agencies. Section 54952.2 is one
such section.
The Fourth District chided the First
District for its "illogic" in failing to
distinguish between these two types of
covered entities, and held that section
54952.2 applied, since the public agencythe hospital district-had indeed delegated its authority (and all of its assets
and real property) to another body.
Accordingly, by operation of the statute,
the private corporations became "legislative bodies" of the District, subject to
the Brown Act, just as the District Board
of Directors is a "legislative body" of
the District subject to the Act.
The District and the private corporations have stated their intention to seek
review in the Supreme Court.
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Buckhart, et al. v. Board and
Lynn McDonald, Real Party in Interest,
_Ca.App.3d_
88 C.D.O.S.
437 (1st Dist., Jan. 21, 1988).
Party Seeking Section 1094.5 Review
Must Create Record Even Where
Agency Does Not
A party seeking judicial review of an
administrative decision under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5 must
prepare a complete record of the
agency's written and oral proceedings,
even where the agency itself does not
routinely create such a record.
San Francisco's rent ordinance treats
a decrease in housing services as an
illegal rent increase. Petitioner (landlord
Buckhart) discovered dry rot in a garage
in a building he owned, and asked tenant
McDonald to give up her parking space.
When she refused, she was locked out of
the garage, and complained to the San
Francisco Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Board (Board) of a decrease in
housing services.
The testimony of the rental dispute
was heard before a hearing officer who
entered judgment against petitioner Buckhart. As was the Board's custom, the
proceedings were tape-recorded, but
without a court reporter and the tapes
were not transcribed. Petitioner filed for
a writ of mandate under section 1094.5,
and asked for the record of the proceedings. He was given some papers but no
tapes of the hearings. The Board certified this as "the original and complete
record or an exact copy of all such
records."
The superior court granted the writ
on that record. On appeal, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the record was insufficient.
Where the court is required to review
the record using either its independent
judgment or to assess whether the findings are supported by the evidence, the
court must have a complete record of
the proceedings. That record must be
produced by, and the cost borne by, the
moving party. The case was remanded
to the Board for preparation of the record.

Senator Dills requested an opinion on
whether an individual could serve on
both the Industrial Welfare Commission
and the Los Angeles Superintendent of
Schools Personnel Commission.
The common law doctrine of incompatible public offices prevents an individual from holding two public offices if
either have an adverse effect upon the
other. 68 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 337, 33839 (1985). Offices are incompatible if
duties clash or if power of one position
is held over another position. 66 Ops.
Cal. Atty. Gen. 176, 177 (1983).
The statutes governing the Personnel
Commission provide that one of its
duties is to classify noncertified employees. The State Industrial Welfare Commission deals with conditions of any
occupation, trade, or industry in which
employees are employed in this state,
Labor Code sections 1173 and 1182,
including comfort, health, safety, wages,
and hours of a job.
The Attorney General opined that
the Personnel Commission position is
concerned with public employees and
the Industrial Welfare Commission position is concerned with private employees.
Although both positions are public offices, the jurisdictions do not overlap and
there is no conflict in serving in both.

CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY
GENERAL OPINIONS
Individual May Serve on State
and Local Boards Simultaneously
No. 87-1101 (Jan. 28, 1988).
An individual may be a member
simultaneously of two public offices, one
state and one local, if there is no incompatibility serving in both positions.

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

Vol 8, No. 2 (Spring 1988)

